# The Dangers of Device Code Flow

**URL:** <https://ifin.network/t/the-dangers-of-device-code-flow/642>\
**Category:** Threat Intel\
**Tags:** entra, oauth, microsoft, azure\
**Created:** [July 6, 2026, 4:11pm UTC](https://ifin.network/t/the-dangers-of-device-code-flow/642 "2026-07-06T16:11:44Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 2\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![mttaggart](https://ifin.network/user_avatar/ifin.network/mttaggart/32/7_2.png) [@mttaggart](https://ifin.network/u/mttaggart)\
**Post date:** [July 6, 2026, 4:11pm UTC](https://ifin.network/t/the-dangers-of-device-code-flow/642/1 "2026-07-06T16:11:45Z")

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**Last Updated:** 2026-07-06T16:05:22Z

 ![image](https://ifin.network/uploads/default/original/2X/b/b2c366646559fe6a0bc74dc94373e585410af35d.jpeg)

## What’s Happening

A number of stories this past week have been discussing the dangers of [Device Code Flow](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/v2-oauth2-device-code), a now-disfavored authentication mechanism in OAuth 2.0. Kasperky’s writeup is the best explainer I’ve seen of the attack.

> **[When checking the URL isn't enough: phishing via the Microsoft identity platform](https://securelist.com/microsoft-device-code-phishing-attack/120350/)**
>
> The OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant specification was designed to streamline authentication for Smart TVs, IoT devices, and printers. Today, threat actors are weaponizing it.

Talos also had a writeup of the “ARToken” campaign that uses this technique.

> **[ARToken: Inside an EvilTokens affiliate panel targeting Microsoft 365](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/artoken-inside-an-eviltokens-affiliate-panel-targeting-microsoft-365/)**
>
> Talos has identified "ARToken," a phishing-as-a-service platform that targets Microsoft 365. The ARToken panel exposes 80+ API endpoints for device code phishing, Primary Refresh Token persistence, email access, BEC operations, and SharePoint...

Device Code Flow was intended for input-constrained devices like Smart TVs. Think like signing into your Hulu account using a short code. It’s not really appropriate for normal auth.

## Actions

Entra admins: If you don’t need device code authorization, **disable it**.

You can and should monitor for `DeviceCodeSignIn` authorization events in Entra.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![fuzzyfuzzyfungus](https://ifin.network/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/f/278dde/32.png) [@fuzzyfuzzyfungus](https://ifin.network/u/fuzzyfuzzyfungus)\
**Post date:** [July 17, 2026, 1:28pm UTC](https://ifin.network/t/the-dangers-of-device-code-flow/642/2 "2026-07-17T13:28:59Z")

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One ‘normal’/‘common’ case where you might see device code flow is some of MS’ newer Teams Room related stuff. Some time back they increased the amount of use in those cases to try to make authenticating input-limited devices suck less. They provide [some basic CA policy guidance](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/policy-teams-devices-device-code-flow) to cover that case.

I’ve also seen it with certain embedded devices(android-powered barcode readers and printers used by logistics staff; I suspect that there are other variations) that interact with Dynamics 365 ERP. Same basic rules apply in terms of scoping that down as tightly as you can in CA.

Basically no reason a ‘normal’ account/user access scenario should be touching device code flow; it might as well have been designed as a phishing mechanism for how suitable to that purpose it is.
