# Usbliter8: A BootROM exploit leveraging a Buffer Underflow and misconfiguration in the A12/13 & S4/5 USB Controller

**URL:** <https://ifin.network/t/usbliter8-a-bootrom-exploit-leveraging-a-buffer-underflow-and-misconfiguration-in-the-a12-13-s4-5-usb-controller/602>\
**Category:** Vulnerabilities\
**Tags:** vulnerability, poc, configuration, hardware, research, buffer-underflow, bootrom, usbliter8\
**Created:** [June 20, 2026, 3:49am UTC](https://ifin.network/t/usbliter8-a-bootrom-exploit-leveraging-a-buffer-underflow-and-misconfiguration-in-the-a12-13-s4-5-usb-controller/602 "2026-06-20T03:49:01Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![Brumbo](https://ifin.network/user_avatar/ifin.network/brumbo/32/301_2.png) [@Brumbo](https://ifin.network/u/Brumbo)\
**Post date:** [June 20, 2026, 3:49am UTC](https://ifin.network/t/usbliter8-a-bootrom-exploit-leveraging-a-buffer-underflow-and-misconfiguration-in-the-a12-13-s4-5-usb-controller/602/1 "2026-06-20T03:49:01Z")

</div>

**Last Updated:** 2026-06-20T04:02:14Z

_ **Summary** _

_A hardware flaw in the Synopsys DWC2 USB controller used by the A12/13 & S4/5_ _chips, as well as a misconfiguration_ _allows for unsigned code execution._

_ **Notes** _

* * *

Setup packets within the setup transaction must be exactly 8 bytes according to the specification. The Application Processor configures Direct Memory Access by allocation a memory region and writing the physical address to the DOEPDMA register.

The USB controller stores up to three consecutive setup packets in memory. When it receives a fourth, DOEPDMA is decremented by 24.  
The bug is that the controller also accepts smaller packets of size 4, rather than 8. This results in a buffer underflow through 12 byte steps. Further, on the A12 and A13, USB DART is configured in bypass mode, allowing free SRAM writes. A14 and later configure DART correctly.

The exploit requires DFU mode and physical access. As this is a hardware vulnerability, all you can really do is get a newer device with an A14 or later.

_ **Vulnerable chips** _

* * *

- A12
- A13
- S4
- S5
- Theoretically A12X/Z, but not implemented in the [PoC](https://github.com/prdgmshift/usbliter8)

_ **Sources** _

* * *

> **[Paradigm Shift - Unavailable](https://ps.tc/pages/blog-usbliter8.html)**
>
> This page is taking an unexpected detour...

[https://github.com/prdgmshift/usbliter8](https://github.com/prdgmshift/usbliter8)

> **[Researchers drop checkm8-style BootROM exploit for A12 and A13 iPhones](https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/06/19/researchers-drop-checkm8-style-bootrom-exploit-for-a12-and-a13-iphones/5259028)**
>
> Owners of affected iPhones can stop checking for patches now: the fix for this SecureROM bug comes in a new handset
